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SUNSET PROVISIONS IN THE TAX CODE:
A CRITICAL EVALUATION AND
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
MANOJ VISWANATHAN*
In this Note, the author argues that sunset provisions associated with tax legislation
are, in their current form, the product of political maneuvering designed to bypass
budgetary constraints and are exploited as a means of enacting what is, in reality,
permanent legislation.  The use of sunsets in this manner has lead to considerable
uncertainty regarding the future of their associated tax provisions.  This uncertainty,
in turn, has created opportunities for legislators to extract rents from lobbyists, gen-
erated inefficiencies for both taxpayers and the government, and increased overall
tax code complexity.  These problems can be minimized, however, if sunsets are
used in a more principled manner.  This Note argues that sunset clauses in tax legis-
lation can be made more efficient by limiting both the occasions in which sunsets
are employed as well as the procedures used to implement them.  First, sunsets
should only be used in conjunction with certain kinds of tax incentives:  The incen-
tives should be simple, of limited duration, and provide diffuse rather than concen-
trated benefits.  Second, sunsets should only be implemented through a limited set
of congressional budgetary procedures:  They should only be included as part of
the reconciliation process for enacting fiscal legislation if the underlying bill
increases rather than decreases revenue, and if Congress enacts and adheres to a
revenue-neutral, pay-as-you-go set of budgetary rules.  These changes, both sub-
stantive and procedural, will increase overall efficiency in the use of sunset provi-
sions in tax legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
Sunset provisions, seldom used prior to 2000, have become
increasingly frequent addendums to modern tax legislation.  A “sun-
setting” tax law is in effect for a specified period of time, most com-
monly ten years or less, after which time the law simply expires.  The
majority of the tax cuts enacted in 2001, 2002, and 2003 will expire
before 2011.  Proponents of sunset clauses claim that their temporary
nature forces legislatures to periodically consider the efficacy of their
legislation, leading to increased governmental efficiency.  Opponents
argue that sunsets are merely a ruse used by the majority party to
minimize the estimated costs of tax-reducing legislation.  Although
there has been some discussion about the Bush administration’s use of
sunsets as applied to specific provisions of the 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax
cuts,1 there has been little discussion of the pros and cons of the use of
sunsets generally.  Other commentators have discussed the historical
development of sunset provisions as evidence of their shortcomings,2
1 William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the
Bush Administration, 2001–2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1157, 1164, 1183–86 (2004) [hereinafter
Gale & Orszag, Economic Assessment] (analyzing economic effects and repercussions of
most recent tax cuts). See generally Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the
Budget and Tax Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863 (2002) (evaluating political gim-
mickry associated with budget rules); William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Sunsets in the
Tax Code, 99 TAX NOTES 1553 (2003) [hereinafter Gale & Orszag, Sunsets] (giving rough
overview of estimated cost of current sunsets in tax code); Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun
Also Rises:  The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV.
335 (2006) (evaluating sunset provisions through case studies rather than through lens of
effective tax policy).
2 See, e.g., Michael W. Evans, The Budget Process and the “Sunset” Provision of the
2001 Tax Law, 99 TAX NOTES 405, 406–07 (2003) (detailing legislative history behind use
of sunsets in taxation legislation); Richard C. Kearney, Sunset:  A Survey and Analysis of
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but have not discussed methods by which the advantages of sunsets
can be maximized while minimizing the costs.  This Note addresses
this scholarly gap by providing such analysis.
In this Note, I argue that sunset provisions used in tax legislation
are the product of political maneuvering designed to bypass budgetary
constraints and are exploited as a means of enacting permanent legis-
lation under the guise of an ostensible expiration date.  As currently
used, sunset provisions create great uncertainty as to the future exis-
tence or repeal of the associated tax provisions, providing opportuni-
ties for legislators to extract rents from lobbyists, generating
inefficiencies for both taxpayers and the government, and increasing
overall tax code complexity.  I also argue that it is possible to use
sunset clauses to create temporary tax incentives that stimulate short-
term economic growth.  However, these tax incentives should be of
limited duration, be simple enough not to significantly increase com-
plexity while they are in force, and provide diffuse rather than concen-
trated benefits.  Lastly, I argue that sunsets will be used more
efficiently if the reconciliation process for enacting fiscal legislation is
only used for revenue increases rather than revenue decreases, and if
Congress enacts and adheres to a revenue-neutral, pay-as-you-go set
of budgetary rules.
Part I of this Note begins with a brief history of the use of sunset
clauses in legislation generally, and then describes the developments
in congressional procedure that resulted in the recent proliferation of
sunsetting tax legislation.  The historical and legislative background of
sunsets indicates that their recent proliferation in tax legislation was
not motivated by reasoned tax policy, but rather by a desire to finesse
budget rules and mask the cost of extensive tax cuts.  Part II analyzes
whether sunsets can be used in conjunction with tax legislation to
create sound tax policy.  This analysis evaluates the efficiency and
complexity of sunsets and concludes that sunset provisions attached to
tax cuts, as opposed to tax increases, are more susceptible to interest
group capture and economic inefficiency.  Attachment of sunset provi-
sions to tax increases still raises compliance and complexity issues, but
these concerns are not as severe as those associated with tax cuts.
Sunsets in their current form are an irresponsible means to minimize
inefficiency and compliance costs.  Part III considers how to ensure
the State Experience, 50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 49, 50–51 (1999) (collecting data about effi-
ciency of state-run sunset programs intended to increase agency oversight); Chris Mooney,
A Short History of Sunsets?, LEGAL AFF., Feb. 2004, at 67, 67, 69–71 (describing shortcom-
ings of George W. Bush’s sunset legislation); Dan R. Price, Sunset Legislation in the United
States, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 401, 403 (1978) (providing overview of early state-adopted
sunset provisions).
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that sunset provisions are used only when their benefits outweigh the
costs caused by the uncertainty they engender and their susceptibility
to interest group capture.
I
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SUNSET PROVISIONS
IN TAX LEGISLATION
The modern concept of sunsetting originated from the idealistic
political reform movement of the 1970s, which sought to reform an
American government considered bloated, inefficient, and beholden
to special interests.3  In order to catalyze legislative oversight, political
theorist Theodore Lowi suggested in 1969 that every law creating fed-
eral agencies be subject to a time limit.4  Lowi believed that federal
agencies frequently catered to special interests dictated by lobbyists,
thereby undermining the democratic process.5  Lowi proposed a five-
to ten-year limit on the life of all congressional acts, hypothesizing
that as the sunset approached, the pressure of legislative review would
diminish the effect of interest group politicking.6
The Bush administration made extensive use of sunsets in
enacting legislation after the September 11 attacks.  Responding to
national sentiment, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act.7  Those
PATRIOT Act provisions that increased government power to investi-
gate, detain, and search possible terrorists were scheduled to sunset
after four years.8  The explanation for the sunset was that the
PATRIOT Act was emergency legislation and therefore should be
repealed when the danger was no longer imminent.9  However, many
academics doubted such a sunset would ever occur, arguing that few
legislators would support the elimination of any previously enacted
national security measures.10  This commentary proved to be well-
3 E.g., Mooney, supra note 2, at 67–68.
4 THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM:  IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS
OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 309 (1969); see also Melissa J. Mitchell, Cleaning Out the Closet:
Using Sunset Provisions to Clean Up Cluttered Criminal Codes, 54 EMORY L.J. 1671,
1696–97 (2005) (providing brief overview of history of sunset provisions in America).
5 See LOWI, supra note 4, at 287 (“The corruption of modern democratic government
began with the emergence of interest-group liberalism as the public philosophy.”).
6 Kysar, supra note 1, at 351–52 (summarizing Lowi’s key points).
7 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272.
8 Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 237, 253 (2002).
9 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere:  Rights, National Security Law, and the
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 696 (2004).
10 Mooney, supra note 2, at 70.
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founded; the major provisions of the PATRIOT Act were overwhelm-
ingly renewed by the Senate,11 approved by more than a two-thirds
majority of the House,12 and affirmed by President Bush on March 9,
2006,13 making several of the provisions permanent law.
Sunsets did not play a major role in tax legislation until 2001,
when the Bush administration made extensive use of sunset provisions
while drafting the Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of
2001 (EGTRRA).14  The history behind the inclusion of sunset provi-
sions in both EGTRRA as well as the follow-up tax cuts in 200215 and
200316 is discussed in the following section.
A. Previous Uses of Sunset Clauses in Tax Legislation
Prior to the Bush administration, sunset clauses in the tax code
applied to a relatively minor set of tax provisions known collectively
as “the extenders.”  These ostensibly temporary provisions include the
targeted jobs credit, the exclusion for employer-provided educational
assistance, and the orphan drug credit.17  A well-known extender is
the research and development credit, which reduces taxes by up to
twenty percent of qualified research expenses.18  Despite bipartisan
support for the majority of these provisions, they are periodically
extended rather than made permanent.19  Two reasons prevent the
extender tax credits from becoming permanent provisions.  First,
labeling the provisions as temporary reduces revenue loss estimates
for their enactment.  In the 1990s, legislators were compelled to follow
pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rules with respect to satisfying budget
11 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Passes Legislation to Renew Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2006, at A14.  The Senate voted eighty-nine to ten in favor of renewal. Id.
12 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Patriot Act Revisions Pass House, Sending Measure to Presi-
dent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at A20.  The bill passed 280 to 138. Id.
13 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet:  Safeguarding America:
President Bush Signs Patriot Act Reauthorization (Mar. 9, 2006) (on file with New York
University Law Review), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/
print/20060309-7.html.
14 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
15 Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
16 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat.
752 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
17 Pat Jones, Week in Review:  New Day May Dawn for Sunset Tax, 66 TAX NOTES
1587, 1587 (1995).
18 Kysar, supra note 1, at 358; see also 26 U.S.C. § 41 (2000) (establishing research and
development credit).
19 Julie Hirschfield Davis, “Temporary” Breaks Keep Tax Writers and Lobbyists in Per-
petual Motion, CONG. Q. WKLY., Feb. 2, 2002, at 293; see Gale & Orszag, Sunsets, supra
note 1, at 1554 (stating that extenders were usually extended each time they were set to
expire).
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requirements.20  These rules required revenue offsets, i.e., revenue
neutrality, within the specified budget window for every new tax cut.21
Tax cuts enacted for a short period of time demand less severe offset-
ting revenues,22 making them easier to fit within a specified budget.
Second, uncertainty regarding the extender renewal process creates
uncertainty in the legislative process, benefiting both lobbyists, who
“thrive on confusion and uncertainty,”23 and legislators who can
exploit the uncertainty to extract rents.  Given the presumption
against permanent tax breaks created by the budget rules, interest
groups are willing to engage in extensive lobbying to maximize the
chances that their pet extender gets renewed.24
The narrow focus of extenders helps to explain why they continue
to be continually renewed temporary provisions rather than perma-
nent legislation.  Since they affect specific niche areas, interest group
efforts are likely to coalesce in support of their renewal.  In 2001, with
the passage of EGTRRA, sunsets became an integral component of
not just the extender provisions, but of general tax legislation.  Many
key provisions of EGTRRA are set to sunset in 2010, meaning that
these tax laws will revert to pre-passage conditions in 2011.25  The
EGTRRA sunsets, however, serve different purposes than the sunsets
in the extender provisions.  The next section describes the unique pro-
cedural rules that govern most tax bills and concludes that sunset pro-
visions are a response to those procedural rules.
B. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974
The Congressional Budget Act of 197426 created procedural
restrictions on how Congress considers bills and amendments with
fiscal consequences.27  The Act established procedures for how
20 PAYGO “required revenue decreases to be offset by:  (1) increases in revenues . . . or
(2) decreases in spending, so there would be no net increase in the deficit.”  John W. Lee,
Class Warfare 1988–2005 over Top Individual Income Tax Rates:  Teeter-Totter from Soak-
the-Rich to Robin-Hood-in-Reverse, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 47, 86 n.150 (2006).
21 STANLEY E. COLLENDER, THE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET:  FISCAL 1993, at
26 (1992).
22 Kysar, supra note 1, at 360–61; see also infra notes 26–40 and accompanying text
(discussing reconciliation process).
23 Jones, supra note 17, at 1587 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 Id. (calling uncertainty associated with extenders “music to the ears of Washington’s
tax lobbying community”).
25 Depending on the specific provision, some sunsets occur prior to 2010. See, e.g.,
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 431,
115 Stat. 38, 66 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (“This section shall
not apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2005.”).
26 Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297.
27 Evans, supra note 2, at 406.
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Congress generates the framework from which substantive decisions
on revenue and spending are made.28  From this framework, known as
a budget resolution, individual Senate committees make the changes
in the law necessary to satisfy the specified budget.  The process of
making these changes is known as “reconciliation.”29
The modern federal budget process consists of two budget “pack-
ages,” one dealing with discretionary spending programs requiring
annual appropriations, and another dealing with direct spending pro-
grams.30  Tax legislation falls under the second category.  Statutory
rules require that the budget resolution set revenue and spending
levels for the following fiscal year and at least the next four fiscal
years.31  Although Congress is required to use a budget window of at
least five years, it is statutorily authorized to extend this window and
has recently adopted a longer, ten-year budget.32  This budget window
takes into account total government revenues and spending.  In deficit
years, the budget resolution might call for an increase in revenues; in
years of surplus, the resolution might authorize additional spending.33
The Budget Act of 1974 had a significant effect on how reconcili-
ation legislation, the legislation implementing the budget resolution,
was considered by the Senate.  Typically, senators have the right to
limitlessly debate (filibuster) and amend any legislation under consid-
eration, with debate ending only when sixty senators are in favor of so
doing.34  As a result, in order for controversial measures to pass the
Senate, a supermajority of sixty votes, rather than a simple majority of
fifty-one, is required.  This is especially significant when the Senate is
equally or close to equally politically divided, and when partisan issues
are discussed.  If no party has a supermajority, the minority party can
stifle a bill’s enactment via filibuster.  Additionally, senators com-
monly attach unrelated amendments to bills, enabling passage of
interest group legislation wholly irrelevant to the subject matter cov-
28 Block, supra note 1, at 872–74.  Discretionary spending programs require annual
appropriations which Congress debates and reauthorizes yearly, whereas direct spending
programs (also known as mandatory spending), e.g., payments for social security, remain in
effect until repealed. Id. at 874.
29 ALLEN SCHICK, RECONCILIATION AND THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS 1–8
(1981).
30 Block, supra note 1, at 874.
31 2 U.S.C. § 632(a) (2000).
32 Block, supra note 1, at 875; see, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 68, 106th Cong. (1999)
(enacted).
33 Block, supra note 1, at 875.
34 See S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, R. XXII, S.
DOC. NO. 106-15, at 16 (2d Sess.2000) (describing senatorial procedural rules).
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ered by the bill itself.35  Prior to the Budget Act of 1974, senators
could include amendments to reconciliation legislation only to
appease a legislator of the minority party.36
The Budget Act of 1974 imposed key restrictions on senators’
ability both to filibuster and to amend reconciliation legislation.  First,
the Act limited floor debate to twenty hours,37 preventing filibuster.
Because filibuster is not possible, a supermajority is not needed to
pass reconciliation legislation, reducing the number of votes required
to pass a controversial measure from sixty to fifty-one.38  Second, the
Act limits fiscal legislation amendments to those that are germane.39
Germaneness, although not specifically defined, has been character-
ized as imposing a more restrictive standard than simple relevancy.40
Both of these restrictions were intended to expedite the budget-
making process and improve governmental efficiency.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the federal deficit grew at an
alarming rate.  The Budget Act of 1974 was enacted during what was
at the time the largest deficit increase, by percentage, in American
history.41  Throughout the 1980s, the primary focus of the budget
debate was on how to reduce the federal deficit through decreasing
spending and increasing taxes.42  Most major tax bills enacted between
1980 and 1993 were reconciliation bills that increased taxes, and there
was no serious criticism of using reconciliation as part of an overall
strategy to reduce the deficit.43  Given the economic climate of
American politics prior to 1995, the question of whether or not legisla-
tion that was tax cutting, as opposed to tax increasing, could be
enacted via reconciliation procedures never arose.
In the mid-1990s, with the budget deficit replaced by a surplus, a
sharp debate arose regarding the propriety of implementing tax cuts
(as opposed to increases) via the reconciliation process.44  In 1996, two
years after gaining control of Congress, Republicans created a budget
35 ELLEN GREENBERG, THE HOUSE AND SENATE EXPLAINED 25 (1996) (“If the bill is
about cows, the legislative rider can be about chickens.”).
36 Evans, supra note 2, at 406.
37 2 U.S.C. § 641(e)(2) (2000).
38 Evans, supra note 2, at 407.
39 2 U.S.C. § 688(d)(2).
40 FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE 854 (1992).
41 According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. debt on December 31, 1975
was $577 billion, a 17% increase from the year before.  The previous highest increase was
from 1970–1971, when U.S. debt increased by 9%. U.S. BUREAU OF PUB. DEBT, HISTOR-
ICAL DEBT OUTSTANDING—ANNUAL 1950–2005, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/
reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_histo4.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
42 Evans, supra note 2, at 407.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 407–08.
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resolution that cut taxes by $796 billion over ten years, offset by
equivalent spending cuts.45  The Democratic leader, Senator Tom
Daschle, raised a point of order46 objecting to the resolution on the
grounds that “enforcing deficit reduction . . . is the sole reason
for . . . [the] vehicle we call reconciliation.”47  Daschle argued that
unless reconciliation bills were limited to those that reduced the def-
icit, the congressional majority could characterize its top agenda
items, regardless of content, as reconciliation bills, thereby stripping
the minority of its rights of unlimited debate and amendment.48
Daschle’s appeal was overruled, with the presiding officer unequivo-
cally stating, “If [Senator Daschle’s] question is, can the budget reso-
lution direct the creation of a reconciliation bill which lowers
revenues, the answer is yes.”49  Although the budgetary issues of this
specific legislation were resolved via the Balanced Budget Act of
1997, procedural questions remained, triggering questions about the
application of the Byrd rule.50
C. The Byrd Rule
It was increasingly common in the 1980s for senators on commit-
tees drafting reconciliation bills to include individual, special-interest
provisions.51  Such provisions did not violate the germaneness provi-
sion of the Budget Act of 1974 since they were not amendments and
were not subject to filibustering.  The Senate responded to this by
unanimously approving the Byrd rule,52 a point of order against extra-
neous53 provisions that could only be overruled by a supermajority of
45 Id.
46 A point of order is an objection made by a member of Congress who believes a
Senate rule is being violated.  Another member may argue against the objection.
GREENBERG, supra note 35, at 69.  The presiding officer (in the Senate, the majority
leader) rules on the point of order with the help of the Senate Parliamentarian, a
nonelected, nonpartisan expert on Senate procedure. Id. at 8.
47 142 CONG. REC. 11,938 (1996) (emphasis added).
48 Evans, supra note 2, at 408.
49 142 CONG. REC. 11,940 (1996) (statement of Sen. Inhofe).
50 Evans, supra note 2, at 408.
51 Id.
52 131 CONG. REC. 28,968–74 (1985).
53 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1) (2000).  “Extraneous” was defined as meeting any of the fol-
lowing standards:
(A) [the provision] does not produce a change in outlays or revenues . . . ;
(B) [in the case of a provision that increases outlays or decreases revenues] the
net effect of provisions reported by the committee . . . is that the committee
fails to achieve its reconciliation instructions;
(C) [the provision] is not in the jurisdiction of the committee with jurisdiction
over [the] title . . . ;
(D) [the provision] produces changes in outlays or revenues which are merely
incidental to the non-budgetary components of the provision. . . .
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sixty votes.54  The Byrd rule was intended to prevent special-interest
provisions unrelated to the budget from getting the benefit of the
streamlined reconciliation process.55  “The Byrd rule has had a signifi-
cant impact on the Senate’s consideration of reconciliation bills,”56
with invocation of the rule occurring fifty-five times between 1985 and
2003, forty-two of which were successful.57  In addition, the rule likely
dissuaded many senators from proposing other extraneous
provisions.58
In 1987, the Byrd rule was amended to include subsection (E),
which has been of critical importance in the tax cuts passed during the
George W. Bush administration.  In response to worries that some
provisions in reconciliation bills would have an effect outside of the
period covered by the bill, subsection (E) added another definition of
“extraneous.”  If a provision “increases . . . net outlays, or if it
decreases . . . revenues during a fiscal year after the fiscal years cov-
ered by [the] reconciliation bill,” the provision would be extraneous.59
In other words, reconciliation bill provisions were only allowed to
increase spending during the budget period covered by the reconcilia-
tion bill.  Subsection (E) was seldom invoked, but as the economy
improved and the budget deficit turned into a surplus, questions arose
regarding the applicability of subsection (E) to tax cuts.
The first successful invocation of subsection (E) with respect to a
tax law occurred in 1999.60  Despite Democratic objections, the
Republican Congress passed a budget resolution requesting a tax cut
and instructing the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Com-
mittees to report reconciliation legislation to effectuate its implemen-
tation.61  The Finance Committee anticipated a Byrd rule objection,
and thus added two provisions to the reconciliation bill:  The first, sec-
tion 1501, called for sunset on the last day covered by the bill
(December 31, 2009); the second, section 1502, restored all the tax
54 Evans, supra note 2, at 409.
55 See Donald B. Tobin, Less Is More:  A Move Toward Sanity in the Budget Process, 16
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 115, 132 (1996) (“In order to stop the abuse of the reconcilia-
tion process, the Senate passed the ‘Byrd Rule,’ which was designed to stop the Senate
from considering extraneous matters on the reconciliation bill.” (footnotes omitted)).
56 Evans, supra note 2, at 410.
57 ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS:
THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” 9 (2004), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/
RL30862.pdf.
58 Evans, supra note 2, at 410.
59 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(E) (2000).
60 The first time subsection (E) was successfully invoked in any legislation was in an
amendment to reduce the cost of student loans, proposed by Senator Ted Kennedy. See
143 CONG. REC. 12,555 (1997).
61 H.R. Con. Res. 68, 106th Cong. §§ 104, 105 (1999) (enacted).
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cuts one day later.62  The debate regarding the applicability of the
Byrd rule therefore focused on section 1502.  Democrats argued a lit-
eral violation, since section 1502 necessarily decreased revenues
outside of the budget window.63  Republicans, on the other hand,
argued that refusal to waive the Byrd rule in this instance would
create instability in the tax code.64  Calling the provisions of the
Budget Act “antiquated” and “drawn to function in an era of deficits”
rather than surpluses, Republican Senator William Roth moved to
waive the Byrd rule.65  Voting occurred mostly along party lines, with
three Republicans voting with forty-five Democrats, resulting in a
final tally of fifty-one in favor of waiving, and forty-eight against.66
Since sixty votes were required to waive the Byrd rule, section 1502
was stricken.  Although the 1999 tax bill was eventually vetoed,67 the
precedent establishing the Byrd rule’s application to tax-cutting rec-
onciliation legislation had been set, and the use of sunsets in general
tax-cutting legislation emerged.
In summary, the 1995 combination of a budget surplus and a
politically divided Congress catalyzed Senate Republicans to propose
promulgating tax-cutting legislation via reconciliation procedures.  As
a result, the Senate was forced to rule on the validity of this approach,
and concluded that although the reconciliation process was an appro-
priate mechanism by which to enact tax cuts, subsection (E)—which
renders provisions extraneous if they decrease revenues outside of the
fiscal years covered by the reconciliation bill—also applied.68  There-
fore any tax cut passed through the reconciliation process must neces-
sarily expire at the end of the fiscal period in question.
D. Putting Theory into Practice:  Sunsets in the 2001 Tax Cut
Cutting taxes was at the forefront of George W. Bush’s legislative
agenda.69  However, there were still considerable objections from
Democrats about the characterization of tax cuts as reconciliation leg-
islation.70  Such objections became even more pronounced given that
62 Evans, supra note 2, at 411.
63 Id.
64 See 145 CONG. REC. 18,172–73 (1999) (asserting that no tax relief could ever be
permanent without waiver).
65 Id. at 18,173.
66 Id. at 18,178.
67 Evans, supra note 2, at 411.
68 Id. at 412.
69 E.g., Richard W. Stevenson, Bush to Propose Broad Tax Cut in Iowa Speech, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at A1 (“Gov. George Bush will lay out the centerpiece of his eco-
nomic agenda on Wednesday, calling for sweeping cuts in income tax rates . . . .”).
70 Evans, supra note 2, at 412.
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the Senate was deadlocked with fifty Democrats and fifty
Republicans, with Vice President Cheney breaking ties.  The proce-
dural debate over including tax cuts in reconciliation legislation esca-
lated when Republican Senator Pete Domenici proposed an
amendment instructing the Finance Committee to report a reconcilia-
tion bill that reduced the total level of revenues between fiscal years
2001 and 2011 by $1.6 trillion.71  Against Democratic objections,
including Senator Byrd’s, that reconciliation legislation was not the
appropriate vehicle through which to enact such major tax cuts, the
Domenici amendment was approved fifty-one to forty-nine, with one
Democrat voting in favor of the amendment.72
By that vote, the Senate had not only reaffirmed that the recon-
ciliation process could be used to protect tax-cutting legislation but, by
including a sunset provision, had also implicitly acknowledged that, as
a reconciliation bill, the tax cut would be subject to the Byrd rule.73
As such, to satisfy subsection (E), proponents of the tax cut opted to
sunset the bill’s provisions at the end of 2010 rather than attempt to
collect sixty votes to waive the Byrd rule.74  The majority party
grasped the infeasibility of garnering sixty votes for such a contentious
tax cut in the politically divided Senate.
Several of the protections given to the 2001 tax cut—bestowed on
it because of its status as reconciliation legislation—had significant
impact.  Although conjecture about a counterfactual world can be
misleading, it is worthwhile to note how EGTRRA’s characterization
as a reconciliation bill affected its passage.  Given that the time for
debate was fixed, it is not surprising that the twenty hours allotted
expired long before all the amendments had been discussed.75  Inter-
estingly, many amendments, including Senator Daschle’s alternative
tax cut bill, received more than forty votes, demonstrating that the
bill’s opponents might have been able to garner the votes necessary to
sustain a filibuster had they been given the procedural opportunity to
do so.76  It is likely that congressional Republicans were only able to
enact EGTRRA because it was passed as reconciliation legislation.
It is important to note that the sunset provisions featured so
prominently in the 2001 and subsequent tax cuts were not enacted as a
consequence of reasoned tax policy principles, but were appended
only to satisfy procedural requirements.  Republicans desired to use
71 Id. at 412.
72 147 CONG. REC. 5663 (2001).  The Democratic defector was Senator Zell Miller.
73 Evans, supra note 2, at 414.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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the reconciliation process to protect tax cuts from the ordinary rules
of limitless Senate debate.  Democrats objected, arguing that if tax
cuts could be characterized as reconciliation, the limitations associated
with the Byrd rule applied.  Consequently, Republicans, favoring the
use of the reconciliation process, did so knowing the tax laws must
necessarily sunset for the laws to be Byrd rule-compliant.  Whether or
not sunsetting tax laws are or can be sound tax policy is the major
focus of this Note, and is discussed at length in Part II.
II
EVALUATING SUNSET PROVISIONS IN TAX LEGISLATION
The three traditional criteria for evaluating tax laws are equity,
efficiency, and simplicity.77  These are not independent criteria, and
they have some level of interconnectedness; however, it is still helpful
to consider each criterion individually.  Equity refers to the general
principle that those with a greater ability to pay should pay more, and
those with identical abilities to pay should pay equally.78  If two tax-
payers are identically situated except for the fact that taxpayer A has
twice the income of taxpayer B, equity demands that taxpayer B
should not pay more taxes than taxpayer A.  But how much more tax-
payer A should pay is informed by personal philosophies of fairness,
personhood rights, and economic autonomy.  Although equity is an
important consideration, especially for evaluating the distributional
effects and consequences of a particular tax, equity is better suited to
analyzing specific provisions of tax laws rather than the general forms
that they might take.  Since a sunset is the latter, this Note will focus
on evaluating sunsets vis-a`-vis efficiency and simplicity.
In its simplest form, the efficiency criterion requires that a tax
interfere with economic behavior as little as possible.79  Thus, under a
completely efficient system of taxation, a taxpayer’s behavior would
be identical to that of a perfectly functioning market.  Many taxes are
enacted with the express purpose of changing behavior;80 however,
77 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 27–31
(5th ed. 2005).
78 Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics,
54 ALA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (defining vertical and horizontal equity in reference to tax
policy).
79 GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 77, at 27.  Graetz and Schenk note that this defini-
tion is somewhat nonsensical, since society needs government to function, and government
must somehow be funded.  However, “under certain idealized circumstances, a market
allocation yields maximum total consumer satisfaction, given a distribution of wealth.” Id.
80 See, e.g., David J. DePippo, I’ll Take My Sin Taxes Unwrapped and Maximized, with
a Side of Inelasticity, Please, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 543, 545–49 (2002) (discussing history of
“sin taxes”).
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\82-2\NYU207.txt unknown Seq: 14 18-APR-07 8:33
May 2007] SUNSET PROVISIONS 669
this is arguably done to correct for an imperfectly functioning market.
For example, a tax on cigarettes might lower cigarette consumption to
its socially optimal level, given that smokers may not take into
account the negative externalities of their decisions, including the det-
riment to public health.
Evaluating the simplicity of a tax provision is equivalent to evalu-
ating its complexity.  This is not necessarily separate from equity and
efficiency concerns.81  If a tax law is difficult to understand, it will
require spending time and money to ensure compliance, raising effi-
ciency concerns.  This also raises equity concerns due to the increased
ability of those with money to manage their assets to minimize tax
liability.  Generally, complexity is divided into three categories:  rule,
compliance, and transactional complexity.82  Rule complexity refers to
the problems of understanding and interpreting the law, including
statutes, administrative rulings, and case law.83  Compliance com-
plexity refers to the difficulty involved in complying with the law:
keeping records, filling out forms, and the government expenditure
required to administer the law.84  Transactional complexity is con-
cerned with the problems arising from taxpayers structuring their
transactions to minimize tax liability.85  To the extent that these trans-
actions are performed merely to reduce tax burdens, they are also
inefficient, since the resources expended on conducting the transac-
tions could be put to more socially beneficial uses.
The uncertainty associated with sunset provisions makes them
susceptible to criticisms on both efficiency and simplicity grounds,
regardless of the tax law they happen to be sunsetting.  A discussion
of the specific characteristics of sunset provisions that create ineffi-
ciency and complexity follows.
A. Efficiency Concerns with Uncertainty in the Continued Existence
of Sunsetting Legislation
Any law enacted by Congress has some probability of getting
overturned; however, this baseline probability of statute repeal is
81 James Alm, What Is an Optimal Tax System?, in TAX POLICY IN THE REAL WORLD
371 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1999).
82 GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 77, at 30–31.
83 Id. at 30 (“The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not
arbitrary.  The time of payment, the manner of payment, and the quantity to be paid ought
to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person.” (quoting 2 ADAM
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 426 (2d
ed. 1778)).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 31.
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fairly low.86  This is especially true of tax cuts.  Many of today’s cost-
liest tax breaks were relatively insignificant when first enacted.  For
example, current law excludes employer-provided health care from an
employee’s gross income.87  This exclusion is estimated to have cost
the United States government $90.6 billion in lost revenue in 2006;88
in 1967 the exclusion cost $6.64 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars.89
The deduction for interest paid on home mortgages is similar:  The
corresponding revenue lost in 1967 was $12.62 billion in inflation-
adjusted dollars;90 in 2006, $69.4 billion.91  Given the enormous cost of
these provisions, one would expect Congress to reassess whether or
not they are sound tax policy.  But because American taxpayers con-
sider these tax cuts to be entitlements,92 Congress does not dare to
question them.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that any tax cut
in existence for more than a few years, especially one benefiting many
taxpayers, becomes exceedingly difficult to revise.
Tax cuts without sunset provisions attached are likely to live on
untouched,93 whereas there is less certainty associated with the con-
tinued existence of sunsetting tax cuts.  As illustrated from the con-
tinual renewal of the extender tax provisions,94 these laws are
frequently the subject of interest group politicking and therefore get
revised much more frequently.  The 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were sun-
setted to ensure their passage—the sunsets were a “means to an
end.”95  Indeed, soon after each tax cut was enacted, Republican
86 As stated by Judge Guido Calabresi, “[G]etting a statute enacted is much easier than
getting it revised.” GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 6
(1982).
87 26 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
88 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDI-
TURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006–2010, at 39 tbl.1 (2006) [hereinafter FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES].
89 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAX EXPENDITURES:  CURRENT ISSUES AND FIVE-YEAR
BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1982–1987, at 26 (1981).  These numbers are in
inflation-adjusted 2006 dollars.  The number cited by the census is $1.1 billion, which
equates to $6.64 billion today. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last visited Jan.
30, 2007) (noting that by comparing average CPI indexes, $1 in 1967 is worth $6.04 today).
90 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 89, at 18.  $1.9 billion in 1967 dollars equates to
$12.62 billion today. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 89.
91 FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 88, at 33 tbl.1.
92 For a discussion of how tax benefits transition from windfalls to entitlements, see,
infra, notes 120–26 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 86.
94 See supra Part I.A.
95 Mooney, supra note 2, at 71.
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leaders, along with President Bush, began clamoring to repeal the
sunsets.96
Sunsets in tax legislation are frequently repealed, i.e., the provi-
sion never sunsets, making it difficult for taxpayers to arrange their
financial affairs.  A simplified example illustrates this point.97  Assume
a recently enacted tax cut decreases the top marginal tax rate from
60% to 40% in year 1, but at the end of year 10, sunsets back to the
original rate of 60%.  Let Annie be a New York City resident with an
adjusted gross income of $100,000 who, after spending annual fixed
costs on food, housing, et cetera, derives maximal utility from her
post-tax dollars by funding her daughter’s private education.  In year
1, her daughter is to enroll in first grade.  Letting Annie’s annual fixed
costs be $30,000, in years 1 through 10, when the lower marginal tax
rate is in effect, Annie will have $30,000 to spend on her daughter’s
tuition.98  In years 11 and 12, when the tax rate will revert to 60%,
Annie will have only $10,000 to spend.99  In total, Annie will then
have $320,000 to spend on twelve years of tuition,100 allowing her to
afford a school charging approximately $26,700 in annual tuition.101
The preceding calculations assume that the tax cut will indeed
sunset at the end of year 10.  On the other hand, if Annie knows with
certainty that the tax cut will be extended, i.e., the sunset will be
repealed, her tax rate will not change between years 10 and 11, and
she will have $360,000 total, or $30,000 a year, to spend on her
daughter’s tuition.102  However, taxpayers are unlikely to know the
probability of the sunset occurring.  While an extension of the tax cut
is possible, it is by no means a certainty.  This uncertainty has the con-
sequence of creating inefficient outcomes.  If Annie is risk averse and
assumes that the tax cut will indeed sunset at the end of year 10, she
96 Id. (“Before the ink was dry, the supporters of the bill were calling for [the tax cuts]
to be made permanent.”).
97 For the purposes of this example, assume that the top marginal tax rate applies to all
of Annie’s adjusted gross income (AGI), inflation is negligible, money borrowed can be
repaid in year 12 with no interest, tuition costs are time invariant, and that once enrolled
Annie’s daughter cannot transfer schools.
98 An AGI of $100,000 with a tax rate of 40% leaves $60,000 in post-tax dollars.  Since
Annie has $30,000 in annual fixed costs, she has $30,000 ($60,000 – $30,000) left to spend
on her daughter’s tuition.
99 An AGI of $100,000 with a tax rate of 60% leaves $40,000 in post-tax dollars.  Since
Annie has $30,000 in annual fixed costs, she has $10,000 ($40,000 – $30,000) left to spend
on her daughter’s tuition.
100 (10 × $30,000) + (2 × $10,000) = $320,000.
101 $320,000 ÷ 12 = $26,700.
102 $360,000 ÷ 12 = $30,000.
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will have $40,000103 that she wishes she could have spent on her
daughter’s education that will be inefficiently allocated.
It is worthwhile to note that the inefficiency illustrated in the pre-
ceding example of a sunsetting tax law is independent of the change in
law affected by the sunset.  This inefficiency is not created by the law
itself, but rather by the uncertainty in the future existence of the law.
If Annie knew with 100% certainty that the sunset would go into
effect as enacted, the result would be an efficient allocation of all her
$320,000 in available money.  If Annie knew with 100% certainty that
the sunset would be repealed, the result would still be an efficient allo-
cation of all her available money (in this scenario, $360,000).  When
the future of the law is uncertain, however, there exists the possibility
that Annie will either allocate too little or too much for her daughter’s
tuition.
B. The Transitory Nature of Sunsetting Tax Laws
The previous section dealt with the inefficiencies associated with
enacting an ostensibly temporary tax provision whose renewal was
uncertain.  That analysis focused on the uncertainty of renewal as
opposed to the temporary nature of the provision itself.  Although
uncertainty in the status of renewal is problematic, so too are provi-
sions intended to be in effect for a limited duration.  This section con-
siders problems linked to temporary tax provisions generally,
independent of the uncertainty accompanying the provision’s renewal
or repeal.
Even if a tax cut is intended to be in effect for only a short period
of time, it is politically challenging to allow the cut to expire.
Although a temporary measure might be justified, e.g., as a catalyst
for economic growth in a particular area, such a provision will invari-
ably result in disgruntled taxpayers lamenting the end of the tax cut
from which they benefited.  A tax cut that was originally perceived as
a windfall becomes an entitlement.104  Although the tax cut might
have outlived its usefulness, in the minds of taxpayers its repeal
becomes a tax increase rather than a return to the status quo.  Politi-
cians will therefore be wary of repealing the tax cut, even though that
might be optimal tax policy.  As a result, inefficiencies are created.
103 Her tax rate will remain at 40%, giving her $30,000 instead of $10,000 in post-tax
dollars.  Since she will have this rate for two years, she will have ($30,000 – $10,000) × 2 =
$40,000 inefficiently allocated.
104 See infra notes 120–26 and accompanying text (describing political difficulty of
repealing home-mortgage interest deduction—which was intended to be temporary—due
to homeowners’ support for deduction).
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Many factors contribute to the transformation of tax cuts from
government-conferred benefits to personal entitlements.  It is under-
standable how some government benefits became perceived more as
rights than privileges.105  But some government benefits, such as the
home-mortgage interest deduction, are perceived as fundamental
rights for no reason other than that they have been benefits for long
periods of time.  The reason for this is that people do not treat out-of-
pocket costs and opportunity costs equivalently.106  People are espe-
cially averse to losses, meaning that they value items already in their
possession more than they would value an equivalent item not in their
possession.  People are twice as bothered by economic loss as they are
pleased with an equivalent economic gain.107  A taxpayer is not neces-
sarily a rational actor when appraising the value of certain tax bene-
fits.  As a result, the public might exert unjustified pressure on
legislators to maintain wasteful tax breaks where that benefit could
potentially be conferred in more efficient ways.
The impact of treating a tax cut as an entitlement rather than as a
windfall is apparent when considering the dramatic increase of reve-
nues lost due to tax expenditures.  Tax expenditures are tax breaks
enacted to encourage specific activities that the government has, for
one reason or another, seen fit to subsidize.108  Some well known tax
expenditures have already been mentioned, including the exclusion of
employer-provided health care and the deduction for interest paid on
home mortgages.109  Although most tax expenditures are not enacted
to be temporary measures, the growth in cost from inception often far
exceeds original estimates and should, one might expect, invite recon-
sideration of their existence.  The deductions for employer-provided
health care and interest paid on home mortgages have grown increas-
105 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261, 263 (1970) (holding that in order to satisfy
due process requirements, fair hearing must be given prior to termination of welfare bene-
fits because recipient is dependent on benefits for survival). But see Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 340–41, 349 (1976) (holding that fair hearing need not be given in terminating
disability payments because benefits not conditioned on financial need).
106 Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1997).
107 Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem,  98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1338–39 (1990).
108 See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy:  A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 706
(1970) (defining tax expenditures as “provisions of the federal income tax system which
represent government expenditures made . . . to achieve various social and economic
objectives”).
109 See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. Tax expenditures are not limited to
individuals.  Many expenditures, such as the research and development credit and the tax
credit for orphan drug research, are directed at corporations. See FEDERAL TAX EXPENDI-
TURES, supra note 88, at 30 tbl.1, 39 tbl.1.
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ingly costly,110 but there have been no serious attempts to repeal
them.  This is because once the tax expenditure begins to benefit more
taxpayers, it becomes more difficult to repeal.  The largest tax expend-
itures have experienced the most rapid growth, implying that once
they “reach some threshold size they become less vulnerable to cut-
backs.”111  Temporary tax cuts are susceptible to the same ossification
into entitlements112 that plague tax expenditures.  In a sense, a posi-
tive feedback system results:  The more costly a tax expenditure
becomes, the more difficult it becomes politically to advocate for its
repeal.  Rather than receive more scrutiny, the most expensive tax
cuts receive less.
This is in contrast to direct spending institutions, where increased
expenditures result in increased scrutiny from the public.113  Usually
there are one or more governmental institutions that have the same
general goal as the one supported by the tax expenditure.  For
example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) promotes goals similar to the home-mortgage interest deduc-
tion,114 and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
promotes goals similar to the exclusion of employer-provided health
benefits.115  HUD’s 2007 budget is $33.5 billion,116 roughly one-third
the total cost of the home-mortgage interest deduction.  These institu-
tions and their programs, funded by direct allocation of funds from
the federal budget, employ inspectors general who investigate allega-
tions of wrongdoing, provide regular audits even in the absence of
wrongdoing, and make recommendations to agency heads on how to
restructure government programs to increase efficiency and accounta-
110 See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
111 CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE 36 (1995).
112 See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
113 In light of growing criticism of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program, President Clinton, in his 1995 State of the Union address, promised to
“end welfare as we know it.”  Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State
of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 80 (Jan. 24, 1995).
114 “HUD’s mission is to increase homeownership, support community development
and increase access to affordable housing free from discrimination.” U.S. Dep’t of Hous.
& Urban Dev., HUD’s Mission, http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf12/hudmission.cfm
(last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
115 The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) “is the United States gov-
ernment’s principal agency for protecting the health of all Americans and providing essen-
tial human services, especially for those who are least able to help themselves.”  U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Serv., HHS:  What We Do, http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html/
(last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
116 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FISCAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET SUMMARY app.
A at 16 (2006), available at http://www.hud.gov/about/budget/fy07/fy07budget.pdf.
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bility.117  In addition, government institutions are frequently discussed
in the media, giving them an additional level of public scrutiny.118  In
contrast, the corresponding tax expenditure provisions, save for an
annual estimate of revenue lost and a minimal amount of auditing
done by the Internal Revenue Service,119 are subject to virtually no
oversight.
The factors previously discussed behind the lasting nature of pop-
ular tax expenditures imply that temporary tax provisions have the
same potential for permanence.  Even though a particular tax cut
might be enacted as a temporary provision, ending the benefit will
become hugely unpopular politically.  For example, the home-
mortgage interest deduction was included as part of the original 1913
income tax, but Congress did not intend the deduction to encourage
homeownership,120 but rather allowed deductions for all interest pay-
ments.  By 1986, however, when the deduction for other forms of
interest was disallowed via the Tax Reform Act, the home-mortgage
interest deduction survived.121  Although supporters of the deduction
claim that owning a home is part of the American dream,122 the rates
of homeownership have changed marginally over the past forty years,
while the revenue loss due to the deduction has skyrocketed.  In 1965
the homeownership rate was 63.4%; in 2006 it was 68.9%.123  During
117 See Kathleen Clark, Toward More Ethical Government:  An Inspector General for the
White House, 49 MERCER L. REV. 553, 560 (1998) (detailing powers of inspectors general).
118 Between December 31, 2005, and January 20, 2006, the New York Times ran 213
articles discussing either HUD or DHHS (94 and 109, respectively).  I gathered this infor-
mation through a Westlaw search for the following terms/phrases:  (HUD or “Department
of Housing and Urban Development”) and (DHHS or “Department of Health and Human
Services”) (on file with author).  During that same time period, the corresponding tax
expenditures were mentioned forty times (sixteen and twenty-four, respectively).  I gath-
ered this information through a Westlaw search for the following terms/phrases:  ((“Home
Mortgage Interest” w/4 Deduction) or (Mortgage /4 Tax /4 Expenditure) or (Mortgage /3
Deduction)) and ((Employer! /5 “Health Insurance” /5 Exclusion) or (Employer! /5
“Health Insurance” /5 Deduction)) (on file with author).
119 In 2003, the percentage of individual tax returns audited was 0.54%. GRAETZ &
SCHENK, supra note 77, at 73.
120 Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie:  The Hidden Costs of the
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1351–52 (2000).
121 See 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(1)–(3) (2000) (disallowing “personal interest deductions” but
allowing “qualified residence interest deductions”).
122 See The President’s Radio Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 216 (Feb. 27, 1993) (stating that
homeownership is “an essential part of the American dream we’re working hard to
restore”); Remarks on Arrival in Appleton, Wisconsin, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1188 (July 27, 1992)
(“I believe that those on welfare, what they really want is a piece of the American dream:
homeownership, a good job, opportunities for their children, and strong, loving families.”).
123 Hous. & Household Econ. Statistics Div., U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancy
Survey:  Historical Table 14, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/histt14
.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).  Although increasing, the rate of homeownership is not
attributable to the home-mortgage interest deduction more than it is to any other factor,
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that same time period the revenue lost due to the home-mortgage
interest deduction grew by a factor of 5.5.124  Although decreasing or
eliminating the home interest deduction makes fiscal sense,125 few pol-
iticians would support such a repeal.126
C. Complexity Costs Associated with Temporary Provisions
According to Judge Learned Hand, a taxpayer has the right to
“arrange his affairs [such] that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he
is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury;
there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”127  Incorpo-
rating sunsets in tax provisions not only makes it difficult for tax-
payers to structure their economic affairs to minimize liability but also
increases the cost of compliance as well.  President George W. Bush’s
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform stated that “Frequent changes
in the tax code, which often add to or undo previous policies, as well
as the enactment of temporary provisions, result in uncertainty for
businesses and families.  This volatility is harmful to the economy and
creates additional compliance costs.”128  Sunset provisions may cause
rule, compliance, and transactional complexity.
Rule complexity refers to the difficulty associated with under-
standing the law.129  This is especially important since the American
taxation system is one of self-assessment, where taxpayers are respon-
sible for paying the taxes they owe and the government performs
random audits of these individual assessments.130  Sunset provisions
by definition involve a change in the tax law.  Any change in the law
requires additional resources to be spent on understanding how to file
e.g., the changing demographics of America.  William T. Mathias, Curtailing the Economic
Distortions of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 43, 60 (1996).
124 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
125 See PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-
GROWTH:  PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 72 (2005) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S
ADVISORY PANEL], available at http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report (showing that
more than 70% of tax filers do not benefit from deduction and that homeownership rates
in United States are comparable to countries that do not utilize deduction).
126 See, e.g., Congressman Neil Abercrombie, Fighting to Save the Home Mortgage
Interest Deduction, http://www.house.gov/abercrombie/pdf/Home%20Mortgage%20Rate
%20Interest%20Deduction%20e-neil.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2007) (claiming home-
mortgage interest deduction is “one of the most important factors” allowing families to buy
homes, and predicting “an economic tsunami” if deduction is repealed).
127 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).  Judge Hand also stated that “a
transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity,
because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose [sic], to evade, taxation.” Id.
128 PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 125, at xiii.
129 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
130 Michael J. Stepek, The Tax Reform Act of 1986:  Simplification and the Future Via-
bility of Accrual Taxation, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 779, 791–92 (1987).
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one’s taxes.  If the law changes drastically from one year to the next,
as it supposedly will from 2010 to 2011, taxpayers will be required to
relearn how to file their taxes.  This concern is distinct from the con-
cept illustrated previously with Annie and her private school–bound
daughter.131  In that example, Annie was assumed to have complete
knowledge of the details of the tax law, which were, in that stylized
example, quite simple.  But tax provisions are not always as straight-
forward as a simple change in the marginal rate of taxation.  For
example, the 2001 tax cut increased the exemption level of the Alter-
native Minimum Tax (AMT) for both married couples and individ-
uals,132 but these exemptions sunsetted on December 31, 2005.133
Although a taxpayer’s income or structure of assets might not change
from 2005 to 2006, it is possible that she will be subject to an entirely
separate method of taxation.  Additionally, the AMT is “one of the
most complicated tax provisions to comply with and administer.”134
Sunset provisions may also affect the costs of compliance.  Com-
pliance complexity refers to the ease with which the law can be fol-
lowed once it is understood.135  With sunset provisions, the status of
the law is in limbo, meaning that taxpayers, being risk averse, will
likely maintain the forms and records required for both the pre- and
post-sunset law.  For example, the research and development credit
was officially off the books between October 1, 2000, and October 1,
2001, preventing taxpayers from claiming the credit for any research
done during that time.136  Yet taxpayers later were allowed to file
amended returns to retroactively receive refunds for the credit.137  If
the status of a law is prone to frequent changes, taxpayers are likely to
maintain extraneous documentation.  An additional cost of compli-
ance is the administrative cost of running the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice.  Every change in the law requires retraining revenue agents so
131 See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
132 The pre-EGTRRA exemption levels were $33,750 and $45,000 for singles and mar-
ried couples, respectively; the post-EGTRRA exemption level was $35,750 and $49,000.
Gale & Orszag, Economic Assessment, supra note 1, at 1233 tbl.1A.
133 David Cay Johnston & Carl Hulse, With Tax Break Expired, Middle Class Faces a
Greater Burden for 2006, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, § 1, at 24.  Following their sunset,
these exemptions were reinstated with the passage of the Tax Increase Prevention and
Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 301, 120 Stat. 345, 353 (2006).
134 Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Jeffrey Rohaly & Matthew Hall, Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Ctr., Key Points on the Alternative Minimum Tax (Jan. 21, 2004),
http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/gale/20040121amt.htm (calling AMT “notoriously
and pointlessly complex,” creating “complicated interactions with the regular income
tax”).
135 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
136 Kysar, supra note 1, at 361–62.
137 Id.
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that they can effectively perform their duties of oversight.  Although
this cost is difficult to quantify, it is clear that the expense increases
the more the law changes.
Transactional complexity is the expense associated with taxpayers
arranging their assets and transactions in order to minimize overall tax
liability.138  Sunsets make such arrangements problematic, for much of
the planning that goes into effective portfolio management occurs
over a period of years, rather than months.  For example, before the
2001 tax cut was enacted, the estate tax had an exemption of $675,000,
with the value of the estate above that amount taxed at a rate of
60%.139  The 2001 tax cut increased the exemption to $1 million and
decreased the rate of taxation to 50% in 2002.140  Over the next seven
years, the tax cut implemented a gradually increasing exemption
amount up to $3.5 million and a gradually decreasing rate of taxation
down to 45%.141  In 2010, the entire tax cut will be repealed.142  Mini-
mizing potential estate tax liability is done through methods such as
the marital deduction, outright gifts, and trust funds,143 all used over
several years.  A sunset of the tax cut would require additional asset
shifting, whereas a repeal of the sunset would obviate the need for
such preparation.  As a result, tax planning becomes excessively
complicated.
D. The Societal Cost of Interest Group Politicking
Sunset provisions adversely affect the democratic process by
encouraging interest group politicking and legislative capture.  Since
sunsets are attached to specific provisions, uncertainty regarding their
repeal encourages the formation of focused interest groups dedicated
to the promotion of specific agendas.  Interest groups are most likely
to form when the consequences yield concentrated benefits and dif-
fuse costs.144  Because the benefited group is relatively small, it is able
to overcome the usually prohibitive transaction costs associated with
group organization and can effectively lobby for the congressional
138 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
139 Gale & Orszag, Economic Assessment, supra note 1, at 1233 tbl.1A.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See generally MARTIN M. SHENKMAN, ESTATE PLANNING AFTER THE 2001 TAX ACT:
GUIDING YOUR CLIENTS THROUGH THE CHANGES (2002) (describing tax-planning tech-
niques that take 2001 tax cuts into account).
144 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:  PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 44 (1965) (detailing relationship between concentration of benefits
and costs in provoking groups to act in their common interest).
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action it desires.145  The diffuse costs, however, are passed to the rest
of the public.
These concepts are illustrated by the lobbying efforts involved
with the research that qualifies for the research and development
credit.  The nature of the credit makes it a perfect candidate for con-
gressional rent extraction146 through interest group politicking.  It is
an extremely valuable credit, yet only applies to a few large corpora-
tions capable of conducting the qualifying research.  Although the
credit is valued at over $2 billion,147 its narrow applicability keeps it
out of the public eye.  In addition, the corporations involved have dis-
posable income to spend on influencing politicians.  Since the credit is
eternally scheduled to sunset, members of the tax-writing committee
who must reconsider the credit solicit contributions from coalitions,
lobbyists, and large corporations.148  The technical details of the struc-
ture of the credit are written in consultation with experts paid for by
the credit’s beneficiaries.149  Because the credit benefits a concen-
trated group (the research corporations) with the cost of the credit
widely distributed over the general public, politicians have an incen-
tive to renew the research credit rather than make it permanent.  The
money is in the treatment, not in the cure.
The estate tax has characteristics similar to those of the research
and development credit.  EGTRRA gradually increases the exemp-
tion amount and decreases the taxation rate until 2010, when the
exemption amount and tax rate revert to their pre-2001 levels.150  The
estate tax affects only the richest 1–2% of citizens.151  Graetz and
Shapiro argue that the diminished popularity of the estate tax was the
result of lobbyists focusing on the American public rather than on
Washington legislators.152  However, independent of the machinations
that led to the reduction of the estate tax in the 2001 tax bill, the
legislative climate following the tax cut created a fertile environment
for rent extraction.  Indeed, soon after EGTRRA was enacted, a pro-
145 See id. at 46 (discussing increasing costs of organization as group size increases).
146 The term “rent extraction” refers to the ability of legislators to extract payments
(“rents”), in some form or another, in exchange for favorable legislation.  Fred S.
McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16
J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 102–03 (1987).
147 FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 88, at 30 tbl.1 (figure cited is estimated
revenue lost for 2006).
148 Martin A. Sullivan, The Research Credit:  A Perfect Example of an Imperfect Code,
85 TAX NOTES 128, 135 (1999).
149 Id.
150 See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
151 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS:  THE FIGHT
OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 3 (2005).
152 Id. at 3–4.
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posal to eliminate the estate tax altogether was supported by a
majority of the Senate.153  But since a supermajority of sixty votes was
required to waive the provisions of the Byrd rule affecting revenues
outside of the budget window,154 the proposal failed.  Yet it is the
chance of repeal that catalyzes interest groups to contribute to politi-
cians.  If the mission had no chance of success, interest groups would
not bother to expend lobbying money.  As long as uncertainty exists,
politicians have the ability to extract rents.155
To be sure, even in a world devoid of sunsets, interest group lob-
bying still occurs.  It is possible that the money spent by interest
groups on lobbying for occasional, permanent changes in the tax law is
roughly equivalent to the money spent on the frequent extensions of
the continually expiring sunsetted laws.  However, there are two rea-
sons why sunsets enable more rent extraction than would otherwise
occur.  First, lobbying groups will pay a premium for short-term influ-
ence, given that the politicians to whom they are contributing may not
be in a position of influence in the future.156  Any long-term “con-
tract” for political favor will necessarily be discounted to the extent
that the legislator might, in the future, lack power to advocate for the
lobbying group’s agenda.157  Second, new campaign finance legislation
limits the annual contribution amount that politicians are allowed to
receive, making it preferable for politicians to receive smaller annual
payments than larger, occasional ones.158
The preceding examples of the estate tax and research and devel-
opment credit illustrate the rent-extracting issues associated with sun-
sets generally.  Their temporary nature creates uncertainty, and with
this uncertainty comes interested parties who have much to gain from
the sunset’s repeal.  In a perfect world, advocates who lobby on behalf
of the public would oppose the lobbying efforts of the concentrated
few who benefit from sunset clauses being repealed or extended.
However, the concentrated few invariably have more resources at
their disposal.  This fact, combined with the collective action problem
153 Carl Hulse, Effort to Repeal Estate Tax Ends in Senate Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
2002, at A1.  The voting was fifty-four in favor of abolishing the estate tax and forty-four
opposed. Id.
154 See supra Part I.C.
155 For a particularly cynical view on the estate tax provision, see Edward J. McCaffery
& Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch:  The New Logic of Collective Action, 84
N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1172–79 (2006).  The authors state that Congress intentionally failed to
resolve the estate tax situation in order to create the possibility of rent extraction.
156 Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and
Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 947–49 (1987).
157 Id.
158 Kysar, supra note 1, at 394–95.
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of getting a disinterested public to care about laws that have minor
direct effects on their personal tax liability, results in both transac-
tional waste and congressional capture.  Legislators are able to extract
rents from sunset date to sunset date, without regard to what is actu-
ally the optimal policy choice.159
III
TOWARD IMPROVED USE OF SUNSETS IN
TAX LEGISLATION
The preceding section focused on the negative consequences
associated with attaching sunset provisions to tax legislation.  These
inefficiencies manifest themselves in a variety of settings.  Interest
group politicking caused by uncertainty over renewal leads to subop-
timal tax policy and undermines the democratic process in
Congress.160  Even sunsetting tax cuts with a broad beneficiary base
can be problematic since popular support in favor of the tax cut will
grow the longer the cut is in existence.161  Ostensibly temporary provi-
sions, therefore, may be in effect longer than is optimal due to public
outcry at letting the sunset take effect.  Additionally, the uncertainty
of sunset provisions leads to inefficiency as taxpayers are unable to
plan their financial affairs around the existence (or nonexistence) of
tax laws with sunset provisions attached.162  Lastly, changes in laws
create complexity through the increased costs of compliance by tax-
payers and administration by the government.163  From this discussion
follows the inevitable question:  Can sunsets ever be sound tax policy?
A. Using Sunsets with Tax Increases
Because sunsets did not come into prominence until 2001, the dis-
cussion of the ills of sunsets, although general, has been based upon
specific examples enacted during the Bush administration.164  The
sunsets included in those provisions were largely attached to tax cuts,
as opposed to increases.  Indeed, much of the criticism leveled against
159 See McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 155, at 1226 (noting that Congress will “repeat-
edly vot[e]” and “reject[ ] sensible compromises” in order to keep issue alive, so as to
prolong rent-extracting opportunities).
160 See supra Part I.A (noting that interest groups benefit from uncertainty surrounding
renewal process in promoting their pet extender tax credits).
161 See supra notes 105–12 and accompanying text (explaining how government benefits
come to be considered rights rather than privileges, making them more difficult to repeal).
162 See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
163 See supra Part II.C.
164 See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 1 (critiquing 2001 and 2003 tax cuts’ sunset provisions);
Mooney, supra note 2 (focusing chiefly on PATRIOT Act and 2001 and 2003 tax cuts’
sunset provisions).
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sunset provisions is exacerbated by their being attached to provisions
reducing a taxpayer’s tax burden rather than increasing it.  A sunset
clause attached to a provision increasing taxes would not be in danger
of becoming an entitlement; therefore, the provision is unlikely to
develop a broad base of support during the time it is in effect.  As a
result, when the date of the sunset approaches there will likely be little
fuss, with the statute expiring with a whimper rather than a bang.
One potential benefit of attaching a sunset clause to a provision
increasing taxes would be the greater ease with which such legislation
could get enacted.  Stipulating that a tax hike is merely temporary
might be the metaphorical spoonful of sugar needed to help assuage
public animosity toward the legislation.  It is also possible that tax-
payers might, after a few years of being encumbered with the
increased tax burden, accept the provision as any other displeasing
aspect of life, thereby negating the need for the sunset at all.  Rather
than be included only because of budget rules and procedural require-
ments, sunset clauses might be used for the purpose Lowi envi-
sioned—periodically evaluating the efficacy of a provision.165
With respect to interest group politicking, a sunset provision
attached to a tax increase that affected a small number of taxpayers
would still catalyze lobbying.  Since the costs would be concentrated,
the affected group would coalesce, overcome transaction costs, and
lobby, enabling legislators to extract rents.166  However, with an end
date of the sunset in place, it is possible that the lobbying efforts
would be less costly than in the concentrated benefit situation.  The
lobbyists would advocate only that Congress follow its own law in let-
ting the tax increase expire.  In other words, since the tax increase as
enacted would only be temporary, it is unlikely that legislators would
be able to indefinitely extract rents.  Legislators could threaten to
push back the expiration date for a tax hike, but doing so would impli-
cate notions of fairness that might be politically infeasible.
Although sunset provisions could be successfully incorporated
into tax-increasing legislation, it is unclear what would prompt such
use.  The budget rules that inspired the current plethora of sunsets
were the consequence of congressional Republicans using the recon-
ciliation process to enact legislation that sharply divided the Senate.
The Byrd rule prevented changing net revenues outside of the fiscal
165 See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text (describing Lowi’s philosophy on
sunsets).
166 JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 334 (1995). Wilson divides political
activity into four categories:  distributed costs and distributed benefits, concentrated costs
and concentrated benefits, concentrated costs and distributed benefits, and distributed
costs and concentrated benefits. Id. at 332–37.
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period in question and, as a consequence, the majority of provisions
were given expiration dates.  With a tax increase, there would be no
analogous Byrd rule problem.  A bill enacted via reconciliation will be
barred if it “increases . . . net outlays, or . . . decreases . . . revenues
during a fiscal year.”167  A tax increase would not invoke subsection
(E) and therefore a sunset would not need to be included.
In summary, sunsets used in conjunction with tax increases are
likely to have fewer inefficiencies and be less vulnerable to criticism
than sunset provisions attached to tax cuts.  Because the Byrd rule
does not require a sunset in the case of tax increases, sunset provisions
associated with a tax increase are more likely to be a part of clearly
planned tax policy.  However, sunsets associated with tax increases
should be employed to create as little uncertainty as possible so that
taxpayers will be able to effectively manage their assets and the gov-
ernment will be able to effectively administer the provisions.
B. Using Sunsets with Tax Cuts
As the preceding section illustrates, a sunset provision attached
to a tax cut has a greater chance of being bad tax policy.  When associ-
ated with tax legislation, sunsets are created for two main purposes.
One, to create opportunities for legislators to extract rents, as illus-
trated by the extenders; and two, as a consequence of the Byrd rule, to
prevent tax cuts from becoming permanent.  In either situation, tax
policy is not the motivating factor behind the creation of the sunset,
and it is therefore unlikely that the sunset clause is worth the addi-
tional inefficiencies and complexities it creates.  However, it is pos-
sible that sunsets could be used in conjunction with tax-reducing
legislation to advance sound fiscal planning.  Rather than being the
consequence of legislative gimmickry, temporary tax provisions could
be used to implement short-term policies that are tailored to remedy
pressing and immediate concerns.  However, any such sunsetting tax
cut must necessarily balance the harms caused by increased uncer-
tainty and complexity with the benefits of having such legislation be
temporary.
Tax-reducing legislation with a sunset provision attached should
not have an excessively long period for which the legislation is in
effect.  Tax cuts that sunset after ten years, for example, have a much
lower probability of actually sunsetting.  Because congressional elec-
tions occur on a much shorter schedule, the composition of Congress
can change drastically over a ten-year period.  Any law enacted by the
current Congress can be repealed by a future Congress, meaning that
167 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(E) (2000).
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changing the composition of congressional members creates uncer-
tainty regarding a law’s existence.  Therefore, the most effective
sunset clauses should be attached to legislation intended to be in
effect for one or two years at most.  Since the composition of
Congress is unlikely to change appreciably over this short period of
time, it is more likely that the enacted legislation will exist unaltered.
Having a tax cut enacted for a short period of time would also reduce
the chance that the tax cut will become an entitlement in the mind of
the public.  A benefit only given in one tax year is likely to be per-
ceived as merely a windfall rather than a privilege.  This would allow
for expiration of the tax cut to occur with less political fallout.  Addi-
tionally, since the tax cut would not affect net outlays or revenues
outside of the fiscal period in question, this sunset would not have
been spawned by Byrd rule issues.  This would give the sunset provi-
sion legitimacy, with sound tax policy rather than political jousting
being the reason for its enactment.
In order to mitigate against interest group lobbying, sunsets
should be applied to tax cuts that provide diffuse, rather than concen-
trated, benefits.  Temporary tax legislation with concentrated benefits
will invariably spur interest group lobbying to either extend the tax
cuts or make them permanent.  With diffuse benefits there is a greater
chance that legislators will do what makes the most economic sense,
rather than what is in their own self-interest.  However, if the tax cut
in question does provide concentrated benefits, renewal of these pro-
visions should be subject to a higher level of scrutiny than that to
which ordinary legislation is subjected.  This will mitigate against the
effect of interest group lobbying.  In other words, there should be a
strong presumption that temporary tax cuts are just that—temporary.
This is especially true if the purpose of the temporary provision is to
provide incentives for behavior that might not otherwise be economi-
cally sound.  If businesses know that the “temporary” provision is
likely to be renewed, they will invest less now than they would have if
they knew the provision would not be extended.  As a result, tempo-
rary tax cuts which aim to catalyze certain behavior undercut this goal
by being continually extended.
Finally, any sunset provision must not create an excessive amount
of complexity in the tax code.  Drastic changes in how taxpayers assess
their liabilities create economic inefficiencies.168  Since sunset clauses
involve modification of the laws after a set period of time, there is an
increased chance of creating confusion for the public as to the appli-
cable law.  Consequently, laws with sunset provisions should be as
168 See supra Part II.A, C.
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simple as possible.  This is especially important when enacting a short-
term provision, since there might only be one or two years for tax-
payers to learn how to deal with the new provisions.
In short, there is potential for sunsets to be beneficial compo-
nents of tax-cutting legislation, provided that the associated tax provi-
sions are enacted for short periods of time and result from reasoned
tax policy rather than partisan maneuvering.  Additionally, the tax
provision being sunsetted should be simple enough to withstand being
changed rapidly.
An example of a successfully implemented sunset clause is the
bonus depreciation schedule.  In an effort to stimulate business in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress
allowed taxpayers to deduct 30% of the value of equipment used in a
business in the first year that the equipment was purchased.169  This
was later increased to 50% in 2003.170  Although the goal of the provi-
sion can be debated, the provision successfully encouraged businesses
to make capital investments.171  This provision was scheduled to, and
did, sunset at the end of 2004.  Congress recognized that as the
economy recovered, there was less of a need for the bonus deprecia-
tion schedule.  Similarly, tax credits for those affected by natural
disasters could be successfully implemented via a sunset provision.
Natural disasters create the need for short-term economic stimulus in
the regions affected, something that a sunsetted tax credit could pro-
vide.  Indeed, Congress enacted such legislation in response to
Hurricane Katrina in September 2005.172
C. Budgetary Rules and the Reconciliation Process
The key problem afflicting the recent use of sunsets is employing
their temporary nature to mask the costs of tax legislation that the
proposing senators intend to make permanent.  As long as sunset
clauses exist only as a concession to an opposing minority, the desire
to repeal the sunset will continue to exist.  With this desire comes the
associated uncertainty regarding the life of the provision—even if the
minority party can prevent a total repeal of the sunset due to Byrd
rule constraints, the majority party can still continually extend the tax
provision.
169 26 U.S.C. § 168(k)(1)–(2) (Supp. III 2003).
170 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 201(a),
117 Stat. 752, 756 (2003) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 168(k)).
171 Kathleen Pender, Capitalize on Asset Tax Breaks by 2005, S.F. CHRON., Jul. 18, 2004,
at J1.
172 See Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat. 2016.
The Act created generous rules for deducting casualty losses.  § 402.
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The simplest way to eradicate this disingenuous behavior would
be to prohibit using reconciliation procedures to enact legislation that
results in an increased deficit.  This, of course, was the argument the
Democrats unsuccessfully presented in 1996 when Republicans first
attempted to pass deficit-increasing legislation via reconciliation mea-
sures.173  However, had Republicans been unable to use reconciliation
legislation to pass the desired tax cuts, the revenue outlays for the cuts
would necessarily have been much less, and as a result would have
been more fiscally sustainable.174  Republicans did not take into
account how uncertainty reduces the incentive effects of a tax cut by
increasing transactional and compliance costs.175  Allowing the
majority party to use the reconciliation process to push through any
fiscal legislation, no matter how costly, provided only that the laws
sunset at the end of the budget window, is irresponsible.
Congress would also be better served by readopting and actually
adhering to the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rules that were first codified
in 1990.176  The PAYGO rules required that any new tax legislation
enacted by Congress be revenue neutral; that is, the legislation could
not lose more money than it raised.177  The PAYGO rules were in
effect from 1990 and periodically extended until 2002.178  Even when
these rules were in effect, however, Congress was able to manipulate
them as needed.  In 1999 Congress eliminated installment sale
reporting,179 a taxpayer-friendly method of accounting, for certain tax-
payers and used the increased revenues to fund, under PAYGO rules,
extensions of various expired and expiring tax cuts.180  However,
shortly after modifying the applicability of installment sale reporting,
Congress introduced legislation to repeal it.181  As stated by Block:
Under PAYGO rules, the retroactive repeal of the installment sale
provision lost federal revenue and, absent an offsetting revenue
increase, should have triggered a mandatory sequester of govern-
173 See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
174 Kysar, supra note 1, at 396.
175 See Gale & Orszag, Economic Assessment, supra note 1, at 1184 (arguing that justifi-
cations for use of sunsets do not apply to 2001 and 2003 tax cuts).
176 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 13204, 104 Stat.
1388, 1388–616 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 632(b) (2000)).
177 Id.
178 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 10205, 111 Stat. 251, 702–04
(extending PAYGO rules until 2002); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-66, §§ 14001–03, 107 Stat. 312, 683–85 (extending PAYGO rules until 1998).
179 Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170,
§ 536, 113 Stat. 1860, 1936 (disallowing installment reporting for most accrual basis
taxpayers).
180 Block, supra note 1, at 866–67.
181 Id. at 866.
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ment funds.  No problem.  Congress simply directed the OMB,
responsible for the sequester, to change the sequester balance to
zero.  When the dust settled, Congress had agreed to use the repeal
of installment reporting for accrual method taxpayers to pay for the
cost of other tax cuts, but when the invoice arrived to pay for the tax
cuts, Congress never paid the bill.182
Since Congress enacted PAYGO, they were empowered to vio-
late it.  Having PAYGO rules that are actually followed would force
Congress to make decisions about difficult budget questions without
passing the buck to future legislative sessions.
Preventing tax cuts from being enacted via reconciliation legisla-
tion and requiring PAYGO rules to be followed by Congress would
reduce the amount of budgetary handwaving that senators engage in
when enacting fiscal legislation.  As a result, the budget-making pro-
cess would be more transparent, with more reliable estimates of rev-
enue generated and lost and, consequently, more certainty in the tax
code.  Using these procedures to check Congressional discretion
would be fiscally sound and would in many instances obviate the need
for attaching sunset provisions to tax legislation.
CONCLUSION
This Note offers an overview of what led to the proliferation of
sunsets in recent tax legislation, the factors behind their inefficiencies,
and prescriptions for how Congress can better implement sunset pro-
visions to create more effective tax policy.  However, as long as
Congress remains nearly evenly divided, the majority party will
continue to use the reconciliation process to enact tax cuts.  These tax
cuts will necessarily be of limited duration in order to circumvent
Byrd rule constraints prohibiting alteration of net revenues outside of
the fiscal window under consideration.  If the status quo remains,
America will not only continue to have uncertainty with respect to its
tax laws, but will grossly underestimate the revenue loss resulting
from the sunsetted tax cuts.  Consequently, legislators will continue to
use this uncertainty to extract rents while spreading the diffuse costs
of this legislation to the indifferent public.  In addition, congressional
gimmickry in altering and enacting budgetary legislation is likely to
undermine public faith in our governmental institutions.  In short,
sunsets will continue to be inefficient mechanisms by which Congress
implements tax legislation.
Congress should limit the use of the reconciliation process to leg-
islation which reduces the deficit, and prohibit reconciliation bills that
182 Id.
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call for deficit increases.  With that limitation in place, and the exis-
tence of a clearly defined and adhered-to set of pay-as-you-go rules,
sunsets might possibly live up to the potential hoped for by political
theorists in the 1970s.  In order to use sunsets effectively with respect
to tax cuts, the cuts should be simple, of short duration, and provide
diffuse rather than concentrated benefits to reduce the opportunities
legislators have to extract rents.  With these safeguards in place, a new
day may eventually dawn on the world of sunset clauses and tax
legislation.
